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WHAT DETERMINES THE SCOPE OF THE FIRM OVER TIME? A FOCUS ON INSTITUTIONAL RELATEDNESS
[Abstract] "What determines the scope of the firm?" is one of the four most fundamental questions in strategic management. This article argues that in addition to product relatedness, a focus on institutional relatedness, defined as an organization's informal linkages with dominant institutions in the environment which confer resources and legitimacy, may help answer this question over time. We tackle the scope of the firm question both longitudinally (drawing on the experience of firms in developed economies) and cross-sectionally (comparing developed versus emerging economies). Overall, this article extends Peng (2003) by highlighting the importance of institutional relatedness in an institution-based theory of corporate diversification.
As a part of the broader intellectual movement centered on new institutionalism throughout the social sciences in recent decades (North, 1990; Scott, 1995; Williamson, 2000) , strategic approaches to organization are considering institutional forces much more explicitly than before (Henisz, 2003; Oliver, 1997; Peng, 2000 Peng, , 2003 . Researchers increasingly realize that institutions are more than background conditions, and that "institutions directly determine what arrows a firm has in its quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy" (Ingram & Silverman, 2002: 20, added italics) . Positioned to deepen our understanding of how an institutional perspective adds to strategy research, this article addresses the question: "What determines the scope of the firm?" "What determines the scope of the firm" is one of the four most fundamental questions in strategic management identified by Rumelt, Schendel, and Teece (1994) . Although the strategy field has pursued this question for three decades, clear answers have remained elusive. Three streams of literature motivate our work. First, although findings since Rumelt (1974) generally suggest that in developed economies, unrelated product diversification (conglomeration) seems to destroy value, it is important to note that only starting in the 1980s did U.S. capital markets view conglomerates negatively, whereas unrelated acquisitions were viewed positively in an earlier era (Matsusaka, 1993) . Therefore, conclusions reached by different studies may be influenced by their sample period (Mayer & Whittington, 2003) . As a result, instead of focusing on the absolute question, "What determines the scope of the firm?" a more meaningful question seems to be "What determines the scope of the firm over time?" (Lee, Peng, & Lee, 2003) .
A second stream of research is the recent work on emerging economies, which documents some discernible performance benefits associated with conglomeration (Chang & Hong, 2000; Guillen, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001 ). These findings have led to an institution-based theory of corporate diversification, which posits that conglomeration may help firms overcome institutional imperfections prevalent in emerging economies (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) . If that is the case, the next question is: Are the performance benefits associated with conglomeration in emerging economies likely to hold over time, given very rapid institutional transitions in these countries in recent years?
A third stream of work focuses on how institutional transitions affect strategic choices (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Peng, 2000) . This work has leveraged the setting of institutional transitions in emerging economies, which are "fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to the formal and informal rules of the game that affect organizations as players" (Peng, 2003: 275) . It is argued that during an early phase of transitions, a relationship-based strategy would be preferred (Peng & Heath, 1996) , whereas a market-centered strategy would surface during a late phase of transitions characterized by more formal market-supporting institutions (Peng, 2003) . While Peng (2003) has focused on how institutional transitions affect strategic choices in general, how institutional transitions lead to changes in a specific and important form of corporate strategy, diversification, remains to be explored.
Drawing on these three streams of research, this article extends Peng (20003) by contributing to an institution-based theory of corporate diversification. We introduce the notion of institutional relatedness, 1 which is defined as an organization's informal linkages with dominant institutions in the environment which confer resources and legitimacy. We contend that a firm's product relatedness and institutional relatedness combine to determine its optimal scope in a given institutional framework. It is possible for a firm, which has little product relatedness and, consequently, would be classified as an "unrelated" conglomerate, to actually enjoy a great deal of institutional relatedness. Therefore, we argue that institutional relatedness may be a missing link in diversification research.
DIVERSIFICATION RESEARCH IN DEVELOPED AND EMERGING ECONOMIES
To date, most diversification research takes place in developed economies. The consensus since Rumelt (1974) seems to be in favor of related diversification and to discredit unrelated diversification (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000: 155) . However, the universality of these findings has been questioned.
There was "a dramatic reversal in investor sentiment toward diversification -positive in the 1960s, neutral in the 1970s, and negative in the 1980s" (Matsusaka, 1993: 358) . Relative to the 1980s and beyond, external capital markets before the 1970s were less developed. Thus, conglomerates were perceived ex ante by external capital markets to have an advantage in allocating capital. Over time, as external capital markets developed, this conglomerate advantage likely became less important.
Emerging economies are "low-income, rapid-growth countries using economic liberalization as their primary engine of growth" (Hoskisson et al., 2000: 249) . It is the striking institutional differences between emerging and developed economies that new institutionalism has been brought to the center stage of strategy research on emerging economies (Peng, 2000 (Peng, , 2003 . Although Western media and advisors often suggest that conglomerates destroy value and should be dismantled, recent evidence suggests otherwise. For instance, in Argentina, India, Indonesia, Israel, Peru, South Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan, Chang and Hong (2000) , Guillen (2000) , Khanna and Palepu (2000) , Khanna and Rivkin (2001) , and Lee, Peng, and Lee (2003) report that some (but not all) units affiliated with conglomerates enjoy higher profitability than independent firms. Therefore, it seems plausible to ask whether the relatively positive link between conglomeration and performance is a function of the level of institutional (under)development, a perspective developed next.
INTRODUCING INSTITUTIONAL RELATEDNESS
Relatedness has traditionally been measured by product market characteristics (Rumelt, 1974) .
However, recent research suggests that market-based activities are significantly influenced by nonmarket, institutional factors (Baron, 1995; Ingram & Silverman, 2002; Oliver, 1997; Peng, 2003) . Extending this idea to diversification research, a more encompassing notion, termed institutional relatedness, seems to make sense. Specifically, we define institutional relatedness as the degree of informal embeddedness or interconnectedness with dominant institutions, which can be formal or informal. Such embeddedness confers resources and increases legitimacy of an organization (Oliver, 1997) .
Although the traditional notion of economies of scope primarily focuses on product relatedness, institutional relatedness may help firms capitalize on economies of scope of a different kind, which is mostly informal. Constructs underlying institutional relatedness include social capital, political capital, and reputational capital. First, social capital is defined by Adler and Kwon (2002: 23) as "the goodwill available to individual or groups." Especially in emerging economies, the uncertain environment results in a great deal of information asymmetry, leading to a potentially high level of opportunism when dealing with unknown parties. Therefore, social capital embedded in networks may become more important (Peng & Heath, 1996) . This may be one of the reasons why closely networked conglomerates exist and perform better in emerging economies. However, as formal institutions develop, external monitoring mechanisms improve and such nonmarket social relationships may be gradually less important (Peng, 2003) .
Second, political capital is geared toward increasing a firm's public reputation, social legitimacy, and political effectiveness when interacting with political actors (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994) . In emerging economies, political connections often affect profitability (Fisman, 2001; Peng & Luo, 2000) .
Since it is uncertain when and where opportunities from political connections would come from, it may be better for firms to cultivate continuous relationships with governments. However, formal institutional development such as the creation of specialized government agencies in dealing with specific industries or domains (e.g., the U.S. International Trade Commission) would require firms to come up with industry-specific political strategies (Lenway & Rehbein, 1991) , which may be better tailored at the business level (as opposed to the corporate level). As a result, corporate-wide economies of scale in political activities may be difficult to attain when formal institutions develop (Shaffer & Hillman, 2000) .
Finally, reputation capital may reduce information asymmetry between firms and stakeholders such as consumers and employees (Shenkar & Yuchtman-Yaar, 1997) . Because information search, especially in emerging economies, is costly, reputation can informally but powerfully fill the information needs for stakeholders by diversifying into multiple industries (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) . However, as formal institutions develop, the reputation effect may be more limited to related products.
Given the importance of social, political, and reputational capital, conglomerates in emerging economies typically develop and excel in their capability for repeated industry entry, consisting of a bundle of skills that are able to obtain licenses from the state, arrange financial packages, secure technology, hire and train labor forces, and establish supply and distribution channels. This generic, nonindustry-specific capability is more than ties to government officials; it embodies an ability to leverage relationships with a variety of crucial institutions (e.g., financial institutions, labor forces).
Moreover, this capability is difficult to trade because it is embodied in an organization's knowledge, contacts, and routines. Therefore, such a capability "encourages those who possess it to diversify across industries rather than become specialists in one industry or product line" (Guillen, 2000: 365) .
It is important to note that we are not arguing that institutional relatedness is not important in developed economies. Conceptually, Ingram and Silverman (2002) and Oliver (1997) argues that institutional relatedness is highly relevant for developed economies. Empirically, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and Bierman (1999) document the positive performance implications of having friends in "high places" in the United States. We believe that the difference is a matter of degree.
PRODUCT RELATEDNESS + INSTITUTIONAL RELATEDNESS
While traditional diversification research focuses on product relatedness, we argue that the scope of the firm within a given institutional framework may be driven by a combination of a firm's product relatedness and institutional relatedness. Overall, it is important to recognize that firms have limited resources, and that it is resources that are required to develop any kind of relatedness, product, institutional, or both. A value-adding strategy is to leverage appropriate resources to develop the kind of relatedness that is most conducive in creating profits in a given institutional framework. These arguments are illustrated in Figure 1 , which depicts a snapshot during a particular period (i.e., the 1990s).
[ Insert Figure 1 about here ]
Firms in Cells 1 and 2 can be found mostly in developed economies where formal institutions are well developed. The difference between Cells 1 and 2 boils down to whether firms pursue the efficient operation of an internal capital market or the sharing of core competencies, respectively. Firms in Cells 3 and 4 exploit institutional relatedness. Firms in Cell 3 are most likely to be found in emerging economies, whereas institutional relatedness is important enough to generate most value and value added through product relatedness may be relatively small. Firms in Cell 4 would be found in an economy where formal institutions are relatively well developed, but informal institutions are still influential (e.g., Japan). Firms in Cell 3, which would be empirically classified as "unrelated," may actually enjoy a great deal of institutional relatedness. Since institutional relatedness is often less visible than product relatedness, firms' capability in leveraging institutional relatedness thus becomes a more difficult-toimitate resource (Barney, 1991) , thus necessitating strategic consideration of its importance.
LONGITUDINAL AND CROSS-SECTIONAL ANALYSES
Economic Benefits, Bureaucratic Costs, and Institutional Relatedness
The existing literature suggests that diversification strategy is essentially a function of economic benefits and bureaucratic costs. Overall, it is "the difference between relative benefits and costs that leads to the choice between strategies" (Jones & Hill, 1988: 160, original italics) . Since the economic benefits of the last unit of growth (e.g., the last acquisition) can be defined as marginal economic benefits (MEB) and the additional bureaucratic costs incurred as marginal bureaucratic costs (MBC), the scope of the firm is determined by a comparison between MEB and MBC. Graphically (Figure 2 ), according to Collis and Montgomery (1997) and Jones and Hill (1988) 
[ Insert Figure 2 about here ]
While this framework is insightful, an institutional perspective adds to the analysis by suggesting that MEB and MBC are, at least in part, determined by institutional relatedness (Kogut, Walker, & Anand, 2002; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003) . Consequently, we undertake a series of analyses next.
The Evolution of the Scope of the Firm in Developed Economies: A Longitudinal Analysis
Taking the United States as an example, between the 1950s and 1970s, the federal government, through a set of formal constraints, probably inadvertently promoted conglomeration. The post-1950 antitrust policies eliminated horizontal and vertical expansion, viewed as potentially anticompetitive, as viable growth strategies. Thus, firms seeking growth were forced to look beyond their primary industry.
Graphically, in Figure 3a , if we hold MBC constant (an assumption relaxed later), the MEB curve shifted upward between 1950 and 1970. Consequently, the optimal scope expanded from D 1 to D 2 .
[ Insert Figures 3a and 3b about here ] However, by the early 1980s, the formal constraints in favor of conglomeration changed substantially. Horizontal mergers were no longer critically scrutinized by the government. Informal but influential changes further called for "deconglomeration." First, academic research (e.g., Jensen, 1986) increasingly pointed out the rising MBC. Second, innovations in takeover financing (e.g., junk bonds) made more conglomerates potential acquisition targets. Financial markets consequently reacted negatively to conglomerates. In other words, the previous, legitimacy-enhancing informal norms in favor of conglomeration diminished (Davis, Diekmann, & Tinsley, 1994) . All these factors forced a downward shift of MEB, suggesting that the optimal scope be reduced from D 1 to D 3 (Figure 3b ).
Taken together, the combined shifts of the MBC and MEB curves resulted in a dramatically smaller scope, not at D 2 or D 3 , but at D 4 (Figure 3b ). Such evolution illustrates how changes in formal and informal institutional constraints in developed economies shape the scope of the firm over time. Figure 4 shows why conglomerates in emerging economies may be able to add value at a higher level of diversification, whereby firms in developed economies are not able to. This analysis relies on two critical assumptions (to be relaxed later). The first is that MEB E > MEB D . Underdeveloped formal institutional frameworks in emerging economies suggest this assumption. Politically, instability plagues many emerging economies (Henisz, 2003) . As a result, corporate political linkages, which are beneficial for firms in developed economies, may be more important in emerging economies (Peng & Luo, 2000) .
The Optimal Scope of the Firm in Emerging Economies: A Cross-Sectional Analysis
These conditions potentially lead to some conglomeration advantage (Khannan & Palepu, 1997) .
[ Insert Figure 4 about here ]
In addition, the analysis also relies on a second assumption, namely, at a given level of diversification, MBC E < MBC D . This assumption primarily draws on the informal aspects of the institutional frameworks. In emerging economies, because of the weaknesses of formal institutions, "informal constraints rise to play a larger role in regulating economic exchanges" (Peng & Heath, 1996: 504, added italics). Although managers all over the world cultivate considerable interpersonal ties, managers in emerging economies perhaps "rely more heavily on the cultivation of personal relationships to cope with the exigencies of their situation" (Child, 1994: 150) .
Overall, for any scope between D 1 and D 2 (e.g., D 3 ) in Figure 4 , firms in developed economies at point E need to be downscoped toward point A (D 1 ), whereas there is still room to gain for firms in emerging economies at point F, which can move up to point C (D 2 ).
Some Extensions for Emerging Economies: A Longitudinal Analysis
In Figures 5a and 5b , we suggest that the possibility that firms in emerging economies may derive net benefits at a high level of diversification does not mean that this is always the case. First, in Figure 5a , we shift MBC E1 up to MBC E2 (for simplicity, MEB E1 remains the same; it will change in Figure 5b ). The increase of bureaucratic costs may be because of (1) "overdiversification" beyond point C due to agency motives and abuses, (2) the lack of cohesion among top executives due to professional infights and family duels as organizational complexity grows; and/or (3) the arrival of Western or Western-trained managers.
Therefore, firms need to downscope from point C (D 2 ) to point B (D 3 ), at an optimal level of diversification still higher than that for developed economies (i.e., D 3 > D 1 ). However, if we push the MBC E2 curve to MBC E3 , then the scope should be drastically cut back from point B (D 3 ) to point D (D 4 ).
[ Insert Figures 5a and 5b about here ]
Similarly, in Figure 5b , we can relax the other assumption by shifting MEB E1 toward MEB E2 . This may be due to improved formal institutions. Therefore, if MBC E1 remains the same, the optimal level of diversification is reduced from point C (D 2 ) to point E (D 5 ). If we use MBC E2 or MBC E3 discussed above, then the optimal levels become point F (D 6 ) or point G (D 7 ), respectively. Note that at point F (D 6 ), firms in emerging economies can still add value, whereas at point G (D 7 ) they cannot.
PROPOSITIONS
Institutional Relatedness and the Scope of the Firm
Overall, it seems that "no organization can be properly understood apart from its wider social and cultural context" (Scott, 1995: 151) . By extension, we believe that no answer to the scope of the firm question is complete without an appreciation of institutional relatedness. Above a certain threshold level (primarily for risk reduction purposes, see Palich et al., 2000) , conglomeration cannot be argued to be either uniformly beneficial or uniformly costly without a specification of the institutional contingencies (Liebeskind, 2000) . This argument, therefore, contrasts with the one-sided arguments derived from the recent Western experience. It is true that from a financial perspective, conglomerates are merely "mutual funds with smokestacks," and that such diversification now may be more effectively accomplished in external capital markets (e.g., through mutual funds) in the West. However, this idea is simply irrelevant when mutual funds-style investment diversification is not available in many emerging economies. As a result, it is not surprising that conglomerates, which emphasize more on institutional relatedness as opposed to product relatedness, persist and some of them thrive in emerging economies. Therefore:
Proposition 1: The more significantly a diversification strategy is driven by the quest for institutional relatedness (as opposed to product relatedness), the wider the scope of the firm.
One of the most significant formal institutional frameworks is formal financial institutions. One way to explain the changing sentiments in capital markets in developed economies lies in changes in institutional frameworks governing the relative costs and benefits of external versus internal capital markets. More efficient external capital markets may reduce the costs of formal contractual relationships between firms and external financiers. In other words, external capital markets and conglomeration (with internal capital markets) may be substitutes to each other (Liebeskind, 2000) . Non-financial formal institutions, such as regulatory frameworks and competition policies, may also have a bearing on diversification strategies. According to the resource-based view, if conglomerates' advantage is to be sustained, it is imperative that certain limits to competition (e.g., government-imposed entry barriers) exist (Guillen, 2000) . Once governments start the process of privatization, liberalization, and globalization, the relative importance of institutional relatedness may decline, whereas the relative importance of product relatedness rises (Toulan, 2002) . For example, conglomerates in Spain experienced a noticeable decline beginning with the country's integration with the European Union in the 1980s and 1990s. They were thus forced to compete more on product relatedness (Guillen, 2000) . Overall:
Proposition 3: The better developed the formal market-supporting institutions, the narrower the scope of the firm.
Long Run versus Short Run
Institutions are not static, nor are strategies. Then, how do they evolve over time, especially in emerging economies? In emerging economies, formal, market-supporting institutions may eventually pick up some of the functions currently performed by conglomerates, thus reducing the value of institutional relatedness (Lee et al., 2003) . The development of market-supporting institutions is also likely to facilitate the widening of alliance relationships, because unfamiliar parties, who would have been deterred from entering into relationships before, are now confident enough to collaborate in order to capture the gains from more complex exchanges (Li, 1999; Peng, 2003) . Alliances with other firms may gradually become a less costly way of doing business compared to internalizing many transactions as before. Thus: Proposition 4: In the long run, the importance of institutional relatedness is likely to decline, and the optimal scope of the firm is likely to contract.
However, "how long is the long run" remains debatable. Because chaos and setback may prevail, in the short run, Proposition 4 may not hold. Although the general direction throughout emerging economies is to introduce more formal market-supporting institutions, their development is almost certain to be uneven (Peng, 2003) . Certain sectors are likely to be deregulated, while others may still remain state-controlled. In these half-reformed economies, conglomerates, by leveraging their institutional relatedness, may emerge as intermediaries that connect the opened and closed sectors (Guillen, 2000) .
During the transitions, at least in the short run, such intermediation capabilities "are likely to become more, not less, valuable for exploiting new business opportunities in the economy" (Khanna & Palepu, 1999: 279, added italics) . Because market liberalization is likely to generate new but uneven opportunities, conglomerates renowned for their informal relationship assets would be especially interested in tapping into these new opportunities (Guillen, 2000) . Therefore:
Proposition 5: In the short run, the importance of institutional relatedness is likely to increase, and the scope of the firm is likely to increase.
At a first glance, Proposition 5 seems to be the opposite of Propositions 1-4 and, more broadly, at odds with the recent global trend toward liberalization and privatization, which would seem to reduce the importance of institutional relatedness. We invoke three arguments to strengthen our case. First, new institutionalism argues that history matters, and that the short run is closer to history than the long run (North, 1990) . Ingram and Silverman (2002: 6) complain that "strategy often suffers from a tyranny of the here and now, a desire to celebrate contemporary phenomena and slight historical ones." Although in the long run there perhaps may be a convergence on product relatedness, the historically derived emphasis on institutional relatedness in emerging economies is likely to continue to matter, at least in the short run.
Second, because organizations exist in and through time, it is possible that no theory or construct is truly "holochronic" (that is, relationship exist independent of time) (Zaheer, Albert, & Zaheer, 1999: 734) . While the construct of institutional relatedness may be non-holochronic, so are virtually all our theories and constructs. This characteristic alone does not preclude this new construct from making a contribution. To make further progress, a necessary first step is "to make explicit the time scales implicit in existing work … by a full specification of all relevant time scales" (Zaheer et al., 1999: 739) . Specifically, we have followed Peng's (2003) "temporal bracketing" approach by limiting our predictions for either the long run or the short run. Although such an approach may reduce the generalizability across time (both long and short runs), it "increases the precision of the predictions, at least within the specified period" (Peng, 2003: 17) . Although this way of theorizing is in contrast with much existing strategy research, which "downplays temporal transitivity" (Ingram & Silverman, 2002: 6) , it may be a more informed, temporally valid way (Mayer & Whittington, 2003; Zaheer et al., 1999) .
Finally, a better specification of what is short run helps make our case. Williamson (2000: 597) suggests an interesting classification: (1) 100-1000 years, (2) 10-100 years, (3) 1-10 years, and (4) continuous (now). Williamson (2000: 608) argues that new institutionalism is primarily concerned with the second and third periods. If these two periods (1-100 years) are reasonable proxies of the short run, they seems to be a window of opportunity during which Proposition 5 may find some empirical support.
Globally, three sets of preliminary evidence broadly support the somewhat counter-intuitive Proposition 5. First, throughout emerging economies, many conglomerates spearheaded e-commerce ventures and consequently expanded their scope in the 1990s. Second, conglomerates recently emerged in China and Russia for the first time, thus pointing to the increasing (not decreasing) importance of institutional relatedness, at least in the short run (Peng, 2000) . Finally, in Chile and India, the scope of conglomerates actually increased during a period of rapid liberalization (Khanna & Palepu, 1999) .
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This article has focused on one of the four most fundamental questions in strategic management. It contributes to our understanding of the scope of the firm question by highlighting the importance of institutional relatedness in an institution-based theory of corporate diversification. While Peng (2003) has articulated how institutional transitions matter for strategic choices in general, we have extended this work by specifying under what specific institutional conditions a conglomeration strategy may or may not add value. Since "we need the frame-breaking experiences that only come from examining and comprehending organizations operating in other places and other times" (Scott, 1995: 151) , we have integrated research not only from developed economies but also from emerging economies. Given the typical one-sided emphasis on product relatedness (which, of course, is still important) in the literature, it seems imperative that much more research investigate the role of institutional relatedness in driving diversification decisions and outcomes both across time and around the world (see Kogut et al., 2002; Mayer & Whittington, 2003; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003) .
The limitations of the present article suggest a number of future directions. Perhaps foremost is a focus on the nature of the firm. The firm in developed economies has relatively clear legal boundaries (Williamson, 2000) . The conglomerate in many emerging economies tends to have "blurring" boundaries (Peng & Heath, 1996) . Such a firm is sometimes called a "business group." The difficulty to identify firm (group) boundaries has not only led to nontrivial measurement problems, but also conceptual debates on whether such an organization is a "firm." Thus, future work needs to tackle this challenging problem.
Second, while researchers have experienced great difficulties when measuring product relatedness, measuring institutional relatedness, which is more informal, unique, and invisible, is likely to be much more challenging. For example, in Chile, Khanna and Palepu (2000: 273) rely on "miscellaneous knowledgeable observers" to identify group linkages. In Indonesia, Fisman (2001 Fisman ( : 1097 uses an idiosyncratic "Suharto Dependency Index" to measure firms' connectedness with the former president Suharto. These measures inevitably carry some "noise." How to empirically capture an inherently invisible and socially complex resource such as institutional relatedness remains a significant challenge.
Third, for conglomerates in emerging economies, given the long-run needs to contract (Propositions 1-4) and the short-run incentives to expand the scope (Proposition 5), where is the point of inflection remains to be probed and clarified (Peng, 2003) . Further, geographical and technological scope (Delios & Beamish, 1999) , while beyond the range of this article, warrants further investigation. Overall, the question, "What determines the scope of the firm?" entails complex answers. We have attempted to capture some of this complexity by advancing and leveraging the notion of institutional relatedness. In conclusion, if this article could contain one message, we would like it to be a sense of the staggering power of institutional frameworks and their transitions which help determine the strategic choices and performance outcomes for corporate diversification. [Note] Adapted from Collis and Montgomery (1997: 115) and Jones and Hill (1988: 166) 
